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INTRODUCTION

This Comment briefly summarizes Robert H. Rotstein's article,
"Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the
Work," then moves on to make short points in two areas: (1) that the
death of the author, to paraphrase Mark Twain, may have been greatly
exaggerated; and (2) problems of conservative opposition, perverse First
Amendment effects of audience-oriented "recoding"' rights, and com* Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work,
68 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 725 (1992).
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; B.F.A. 1978, Wayne State
University; M.A. 1986, Hunter College; J.D. 1990, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1993, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. In particular, I would like to acknowledge my debt to the work and insights of
Peter Jaszi, James Boyle, Rosemary Coombe, and Jane Gaines which have greatly influenced my
thinking on intellectual property. I would like to also thank Wendy Gordon for asking me to participate in this symposium and Robert Rotstein for his thoughtful "text." Lastly, I would like to
thank the contributions of the editorial staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review for all of their many
hours of effort.
1. See generally HAL FOSTER, RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS (1985);
see also Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics" IntellectualProperty Laws
and Democratic Dialogue,69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1864 (1991).
805

[Vol. 68:805

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

modification may arise from employing the textual strategies suggested in
Rotstein's article-a recharacterization of copyright's subject from a
static reified "work" to a dynamic "text," or "event of speech," turning
copyright's emphasis from a property regime into a regime of speech
regulation.
11.

SUMMARY

Whatever relevance contemporary literary criticism may have to
legal hermeneutics in general, 2 in the area of copyright law-the law per-

taining to literary texts 3-interpretive
part. 4

Robert

Rotstein's

theory has many insights to im-

article, "Beyond

Metaphor:

Copyright

2. See sources cited in Rotstein, supra note *, at 728 n.12; see also STANLEY FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY

AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) [herinafter FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY]; STANLEY FISH,
Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Stephen Mailloux eds., 1988); SANFORD LEVrNSON, CONSTrruTIONAL FAITH

(1988);

RICHARD A.

POSNER,

LAW AND

LITERATURE:

A

MISUNDERSTOOD

RELATION (1988); TEXTUAL STRATEGIES (Josui V. Harari ed., 1979); James Boyle, The Politicsof
Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Stanley
Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985); Pierre Schlag, CannibalMoves.:An Essay on
the Metamorphosesof the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1988); Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors
de Texte, C'est Moi' The Politics ofForm and the Domestication ofDeconstrUction, 11 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1631 (1990) [herinafter Schlag, The PoliticsofForm]; Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1990) [herinafter Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go]; Pierre Schlag,
The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1627 (1991); Robin West, Jurisprudenceas Narrative:
An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 145 (1985); James B. White,
What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (book review).
3. I use the words "text" and "work" in the manner of Hal Foster, who defines the relationship thusly:
This theoretical redefinition of the artifact can also be seen as a passage from a modernist
"work" to a postmodernist "text." I use these terms heuristically: "work" to suggest an
aesthetic, symbolic whole sealed by an origin (i.e., the author), and an end (i.e., a represented reality or transcendent meaning), and "text" to suggest an a-aesthetic, "multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash." The
difference between the two rests finally on this: for the work the sign is a stable unit of
signifier and signified (with the referent assured or, in abstraction, bracketed), whereas the
text reflects on the contemporary dissolution of the sign and the released play of the
signifiers.
FOSTER, supra note 1, at 129 (citation omitted).
4. See, eg., James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail,
and InsiderTrading, 80 CAL L. REv. 1415 (1992) [hereinafter Boyle, Low and Information];James
Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers,37 AM. U. L. REv. 625 (1988)
[hereinafter Boyle, The Searchfor an Author]; Coombe, supra note 1; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397
(1990); Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul Rabinow ed. &
Josu6 V. Harari trans. 1989); Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 93; Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright
and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293 (1992) [hereinafter, Jaszi, Author
Effect]; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Authorship, " 1991 DUKE
LJ. 455 [hereinafter Jaszi, Metamorphoses];David Lange, At Play in the Fieldsof the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRODS., Spring 1992, at 139 [hereinafter Lange, At Play]; David Lange, Recognizing the Public Do-
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Infringement and the Fiction of the Work," is a thoughtful examination
of some of the gaps between poststructuralist literary theory and copyright law. The metaphor Rotstein would like to move beyond is the
idea/expression dichotomy, that much-maligned and infamous mediator
between private property and free information flow permeating copyright
jurisprudence. 5 The means for us to move beyond this metaphor, Rotstein suggests, is assimilating the idea of the "text" into copyright law.
Rotstein claims that the raw materials to do so are already there. He also
proposes recharacterizing current copyright law's troubled subject as a
process (constructing and reconstructing dynamic texts) rather than as a
product (producing a "thingifled" 6 work).
Rotstein begins with a fascinating "fast-forward" historical summary of modes of literary criticism from antiquity to postmodernity, 7 in
part to demonstrate the social construction and historical contingency of
our concepts of Romantic authorship," literary "originality," 9 and the
autonomous "work." 10 Along the way we encounter the rise and fall of
the post-war New Critics," the death of the author, 12 as well as the puzmain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autum 1981, at 147; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Monroe E. Price & Malla Pollack, The Author in Copyright Note for the
Literary Critic, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 703 (1992); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 277 (1992).
5. This tension has been formulated as the idea/expression dichotomy, i.e., ideas are free, but
expressions may be owned. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b)
(1991) ("In no case does copyright protection for an origianl work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or emobodied in such work.").
6. Felix Cohen gives an example of "thingification":
Nobody has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations if we
don't believe in angels? To be sure, some of us have seen corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc.... But this does not give us the right to hypostatize, to "thingify," the corporation, and to assume that it travels about from State to State as mortal men travel.
Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811
(1935).

7. 1 am using postmodernity in the same sense as Rosemary J. Coombe in Coombe, supra note
1,at 1862 ("To simplify things, I will refer to the historical period as the condition of postmodernity,
to the era's cultural qualities as postmodernism, and to the practices situated in these contexts as
postmodern or postmodernist."); see also DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POsTMODERNITY:
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE (1989); LINDA HUTCHEON, THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNISM (1989); JEAN-FRANgoIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A

REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984); MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION: POST5TRUCTURALISM AND SOCIAL CONTEXT (1990).
8. Rotstein, supra note *, at 733-734, and sources cited in n.37.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id
Id. 734-735, and sources cited in n.47.
Id. at 734-742, and sources cited in nn.45-73.
Id. at 734-735, and sources cited in n.47; see also, Michael Hancher, Dead Letter" Wills and

Poems, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 103 (commenting on Roland

Barthes: "The Author, according to Barthes, conveniently erases himself in deference to the Reader,
who is thereby freed to take his pleasure with the text. 'Mhe birth of the reader,' he says in conclusion, 'must be ransomed by the death of the author.' ").

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:805

zling persistence of the idea of the autonomous "work" in copyright law.
Despite and counter to the pervasive rise of poststructuralist literary theories of open-ended texts, the idea of the "work" gives rise to multiple,
inconsistent interpretations. 13 Rotstein argues that, in spite of the possibility of radical textual indeterminacy which importing poststructural literary analysis into copyright doctrine may facilitate, such potential
boundlessness may be constrained by characterizing "texts" as utterances
or "events of speech"(with the determinacy of an activity) occurring
within particular "interpretive communities."' 14 Furthermore, accurate
legal acknowledgement and recognition of the intertextual' 5 nature of
audience participation in the creation of texts generates further constraining analytic tools such as "convention, ' 16 "genre, ' 17 and "code." 1 8
This recharacterization of the "work" as a "speech activity" or
practice, parallels the legal treatment of speech events in other areas of
the law, such as defamation, First Amendment, and obscenity law.' 9
Legal determinations and regulations of these other areas are highly relational and context-bound, tied to specific temporal, spatial, economic,
political, and social contexts in which "speech events" or "texts" occur. 20
Thus depicted, copyright law's treatment of dynamic visual, literary, or
musical texts as "thingified works" is a peculiar anomaly. For the sake
of consistency and clearer adjudication, Rotstein suggests that copyright
law should be refocused as a species of regulation pertaining to acts of
speech, 21 rather than a peculiar subspecies of property law pertaining to
objectified works.
Having laid out a justification for why copyright law should
assimilate the idea of the "text," Rotstein then examines closely four
particularly troubled areas of copyright jurisprudence: (1) entitlement to copyright; 22 (2) scope of copyright;2 3 (3) substantial simi13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
ple, the
ousness

Rotstein, supra note *,at 746-49.
Id. at 739-42, and sources cited in n.67.
Id. at 737-38, and sources cited in n.57.
Id. at 740-41, and source in n.71.
Id. at 785, and source cited in n.258.
Id. at 740-41, and sources cited in n.71.
Id. at 741 n.73. Other relevant parallels are found in trademark and patent law. For examnotions of genericity, functionality, and secondary meaning in trademark law and nonobviand prior art in patent law are closely informed by context, history, and convention. See

DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

(1992) [hereinafter CHISUM] (§ 2C[4] on nonobviousness; § 2C[5] on prior art; § 5C[2][c][v] on functionality; § 5C[31[a][vii] on secondary meaning; § 5C[3][b] on genericity). See also John S.Wiley,
Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 119, 140-144 (1992).
20. Rotstein, supra note *,at 741 n.73.
21. Id. at 739-42.
22. Id. at 742-58.
23. Id. at 758-76.
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larity;24 and last but not least, (4) fair use. 25 Using a historically broad
range of leading cases from each of these areas, Rotstein argues that the
surreptitious packing in of the New Critical concept of the autonomous
"'work" has resulted in an ungrounded, ad hoc, spate of inconsistent
cases.26 In each of these areas, Rotstein discusses and gives examples of
how assimilating the idea of the "text," along with a cluster of related
ideas such as "genre," "convention/modulated convention," "formulas,"
and "code" into copyright law would work to clarify underlying policy
27
issues at stake.
While Rotstein criticizes aspects of contemporary doctrine thoroughly, articulating clearly how the application of literary theory to
copyright law might operate, he takes pains to disclaim a prescriptive or
normative agenda. 28 However, Rotstein does offer examples of the types
of policies, purposes, and principles which would be clarified by absorbing poststructuralist insights, such as advancing the legal system's interest in consistency and clarity in adjudication (legitimacy);29 accurately
mirroring how "works of authorship" operate (bringing law in line with
life); 30 facilitating speech by recognizing and accommodating the "audience's" interpretive interests; 31 and ensuring that generic conventions re32
main available to the public for construction of further texts.
I agree with Rotstein's observation that copyright law is a mess, full
of incoherent decisions and fundamental disagreements over a broad
range of issues, and I also think that the assimilation of a broader contextual approach has much to recommend it. However, I would like to
make a few points, expanding on each briefly. First, I think proclamations of the death of the author and recognition of the myth of originality
may be somewhat exaggerated, and that underestimating the persistence
of such author-based reasoning may have serious consequences on
speech. Second, there may be some problematic aspects in implementing
24. Id. at 776-93.
25. Id. at 793-803.
26. Id. at 746-49.
27. Id. at 749-58, 766-76, 784-93.
28. See, eg., id at 729 ("the Article is descriptive rather than prescriptive"); id at 754 C(I
stress again that the above examples of how 'originality' could be approached from the perspective of
contemporary literary criticism are not necessarily suggestions about how copyright should be, but
are merely examples of how it might be."); id. at 774 ("Again, the point here is not to suggest that
one approach is more appropriate than another."); id. at 776 ("IT]he discussion here has not called
for any particular new system of copyright that would grant more (or less) protection than the

current system provides.").
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

739-42.
1.
801.
775-76.
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a strategy which characterizes a "text" as a "speech event," not least of
which is considerable opposition from conservative academics and judges
(not to mention media-based copyright industries conditioned to conceive of a copyright as private property).
To make these points, however, requires "recoding" Rotstein somewhat, and I wish to make a few qualifications and disclaimers. I use the
term "audience 'recoding' rights" to represent one way of thinking about
the implications of the textual strategies Rotstein discusses. "Recoding"
has been described by Rosemary Coombe as a set of subcultural practices
and activities in which "the consumption of commodified representa-

tional forms is productive activity in which people engage in meaningmaking to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas. ' 33 By
talking about audience "recoding" rights, I realize I am engaging in my
own sort of "mini-reification," because: (1) an audience is no more stable
than a "text" (there is no "there" there); and (2) the meaning of the word
"rights" is extremely ambiguous. 34 However, to explore implications of
some aspects of these textual strategies, I, the intertextual producer, am
placing the metaphysical idea of "recoding" rights into our "textual"
toolkit, so please bear with me as we nomadically wander into the

intertext.
33. See Coombe, supra note 1, at 1863. Hal Foster notes:
Subcultural practice differs from the countercultural (e.g., '60's student movements) in that
it recodes cultural signs rather than poses a revolutionary program of its own .... [Tihe
subcultural must be grasped as a textual activity. Plural and symbolic, its resistance is
performed through a "spectacular transformation of a whole range of commodities, values,
common-sense attitudes, etc." through a parodic collage of the privileged signs of gender,
class and race that are contested, confirmed, "customized." In this bricolage the false nature of these stereotypes is exposed as the arbitrary character of the social/sexual lines that
they define. At the same time these signs ... are made over into "genuinely expressive
artifice," one that resists, at least in its first moment, the given discursive and economic
circuits.
FOSTER, supra note 1, at 170 (quoting DICK HEBDIDGE, SuBCULTURE 116 (1979)). See also the
comments of David Harvey:
Both producers and consumers of "texts" (cultural artifacts) participate in the production
of significations and meanings . . . Minimizing the authority of the cultural producer
creates the opportunity for popular participation and democratic determinations of cultural values, but at the price of a certain incoherence, or more problematic, vulnerability to
mass-market manipulation.
HARVEY, supra note 7, at 51.
34. I am not using the ideas of "rights" in a Blackstonian pre-political, universalist sense, but as
a rhetorical device to evoke the idea of a polymorphous, diffuse, fluid locus where interests in and
pertaining to texts intersect. On some of the controversies surrounding the problematic nature of
"rights," see generally Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar. Does Critical Legal Studies Have
What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.301 (1987); Mar J. Matsuuda, Looking to the
Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Note" Reconstructed Ideals from DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L REv. 401 (1987); cf Morton J.Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1988).
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III.

THE AUTHOR Is DEAD, BUT WHO SIGNS THE
DEATH CERTIICATE

A.

Jaszi on Authorship and Copyright

Claims about the death of the author are somewhat overstated. Despite Roland Barthes, 35 Michel Foucault, 36 Jacques Derrida, 37 the demise of the New Criticism, and the rise of poststructuralist literary
theory, the author concept is far from legal expiration. Whether or not it
should be abandoned is an entirely different question from whether or not
it has been abandoned (in copyright circles at least). To make this point,
I will discuss some recent cases, the upsurge of interest in state and federal moral rights statutes, and the pervasiveness of author-type reasoning
in other areas of the law. These examples indicate that the construct of
Romantic authorship and its accompanying image of originality is far
from extirpated, but definitely is in need of a major overhaul.
An engrossing recent issue of the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment
Law Journal was devoted to papers from a symposium on Intellectual
Property and the Construction of Authorship. 38 These papers focused
on the social, historical, and legal construction of authorship and its
relationship to a broad range of topics from Helen Keller as putative plagiarist 39 to digital sound sampling technology and HipHop music.4° However, I would like to single out and discuss
some aspects of a particular piece: Peter Jaszi's "On The Author
' '4 1
Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity.
After noting the convergence of Michel Foucault, 42 Benjamin Kap35. ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 146 (1967).
36. Foucault, supra note 4, at 141-60.
37. Jacques Derrida, Structure Sign & Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences; in WRIrING AND DIFFERENCE 196-231 (Alan Bass trans., 1978).

38. See 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 227-725 (1992) (publishing papers from the Intellectual
Property and the Construction of Authorship Conference); see also BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE (1979); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE
AND THE LAW (1991); SUSAN STEWART, CRIMES OF WRITING: PROBLEMS IN THE CONTAINMENT

OF REPRESENTATION (1991); Boyle, The Searchfor an Author. supra note 4, at 625; Mark Rose, The
Author as Proprietor:Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy ofModern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984).
39. See Jim Swan, Touching Words Helen Keller, Plagiarism,Authorship, 10 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 321 (1992).
40. See David Sanjek, "Don'tHave to DJ No More". Sampling and the "Autonomous" Creator,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607 (1992).
41. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4; see also Jaszi, Metamorphoses,supra note 4 (discussing
the uneasy and dynamic relationship between authorship and the concept of the "work," as well as
the implications of the curious return of author-reasoning in areas of copyright such as the work-forhire-doctrine, renewal and reversion, and artist's moral rights legislation).
42. Foucault, supra note 4, at 141 ("[t]he coming into being of the notion of the author constitutes a privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas").
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lan, 43 and the spate of recent literary and legal scholarship on the emergence of the Romantic author in late-eighteenth century Europe, Professor Jaszi incisively analyzes and criticizes some recent copyright cases to
show that, far from being dead, contemporary courts, from the Supreme
Court on down, continue using an individualist model of "author-reasoning" in deciding copyright cases. Furthermore, Jaszi argues that the image of the clearly individuated Romantic author blinds our copyright
jurisprudence from recognizing, rewarding, or protecting alternate
modes of creative cultural production such as serial, collaborative, and
corporate (and by implication, audience-as-textual-co-creator type of authorship, which Rotstein's approach implies) forms of authorship.44
Jaszi contends that, despite the lack of legal recognition, these deviant
forms of multiple authorship are nonetheless proliferating. 45
To demonstrate the curious persistence of the individualist Romantic author construct (along with its tendency to devalue corporate, serial,
or collaborative production of intellectual works), Jaszi introduces the
1991 Feist46 case as "Exhibit A." In Feist, the Supreme Court held that
copyright protection was unavailable for an alphabetically organized
white pages phone directory because its producers had expended, "insufficient creativity to make it original." 47 Justice O'Connor, writing for an
unanimous Court, reasoned that copyright should only protect those
works which "are original,and are founded in the creative powers of the
mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual
labor .. ,,48 Jaszi points out that by denying copyright protection to
the producers of the white pages, the Court discounted the collaborative
and collective nature of fact-gathering reflected in the assembly and composition of a white pages directory in favor of a particular vision of
clearly individuated authorship and originality. Commentators have remarked that the Supreme Court's embrace of author-reasoning in Feist
43. BENJAMIN KAPLAN,AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967).

44. Jaszi, Author Effect; supra note 4, at 304.
45. Id.at 318-19.
46. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S.Ct. 1282 (1991). See, eg., Jaszi,
Author Effect, supra note 4, at 300-04; see also Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in
Copyright Law, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 3; Gordon, supra note 4; Wendy J.
Gordon, On Owning Information, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 185.
47. Feist, II I S.Ct. at 1296 ("[Rural lacked] the modicum of creativity necessary to transform
mere selection into copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white
pages directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original."); see also Jaszi, Author Effect,
supra note 4, at 300.
48. Feist, I IS.Ct. at 1288 ("[w]hile the word writings may be liberally construed... it is only
such as are original,and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to
be protected are thefruits ofintellectual labor .. ")(quoting the Trade-Mark cases, 180 U.S. 82, 94
(1879)); see also Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 301.
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eclipsed other policy bases on which the judgment might have turned. 49
To the Feist court, because only clearly individuated authors can possess
sufficient creative originality to justify copyright protection, the absence
of such an authorial subject foreclosed copyright protection for the white
pages.
In Feist, the white pages were consigned by the Court to the status
of being mere "source" materials "out there" for the taking, presumably
waiting to be put to some useful purpose by a future "author" (in spite of
the way the production process of compiling the white pages exemplified
a complex form of collective writing).50 This, in part, is what Jaszi calls
"The Author Effect": by focusing on a highly individualized model of
cultural production, types of alternate cultural practices are downgraded
and made invisible "mere 'sources'" (set up for over-exploitation and
eventual exhaustion). 51
Jaszi next cites the 1992 Second Circuit case, Rogers v. Koons,5 2 as
displaying further troubling aspects of author-reasoning.5 3 At issue in
Koons was the unauthorized adaptation by postmodernist sculptor Jeff
Koons of a copyrighted black-and-white notecard photograph taken by
photographer Art Rogers of a couple holding a litter of puppies, entitled
"Puppies." Koons used "Puppies" to create a garishly-colored 3-dimensional sculpture called "String of Puppies" which was displayed at the
1988 "Banality Show" in New York City. From the outset, the Second
Circuit's opinion casts the parties into a set of polarities defined by a
particular vision of creativity as exemplified by the Romantic author: (1)
49. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 301, 303 ("As a matter of information policy, the
Court may have been right to cut back on... legal protection for compilations of data.... There is
no indication, however, that the Court gave this.., any consideration .... ."); seegenerally Gordon,
supra note 4, at 94 ("Though I entirely concur with the denial of copyright, the opinion's reasoning
was deeply flawed."); contra, Abrams, supra note 46, at 44 ("By insisting that the constitutional
requirement of authorship embodied in the standard of originality have some meaningful minimum,
the Supreme Court has given the issues in Feist a resolution that is sound both in doctrine and
practice, and has done so in an opinion that bodes well for the future.)."
50. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 314.
51. Id at 302 ("[T]he law often proves ungenerous to non-individualistic cultural productions,
like 'folkioric' works, which cannot be reimagined as products of solitary, originary 'authorship' on
the part of one or more discrete and identifiable 'authors' ....
Such works are marginalized or
become literally invisible within the prevailing ideological framework of discourse in
copyright ... ").
52. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992) ("Plaintiff, Art
Rogers, a 43 year-old professional artist photographer, has a home and studio at Point Reyes, California, where he makes his living by creating, exhibiting, publishing and otherwise making use of his
rights in his photographic works."); see also Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 305-12; Lynne A.
Greenberg, The Art of Appropriatiorn Puppis Piracy and Postmodernism, II CARDozo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1 (1992).
53. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 305-12.
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characterization of the parties ("pure" artist/photographer 54 v. conniving and cynical art world rook); 55 (2) methods of working (solo production of photographs 56 v. fabrication to specification by different
workshops of skilled laborers); 57 and (3) subject matter (photo from life58
v. parodistic treatment of pre-existing cultural material). 59
By thus casting the dichotomies between the works or texts produced by Art Rogers, earnest artist/photographer, and Jeff Koons, cynical postmodernist sculptor, the judicial calculus was freighted to come
out in Rogers' favor on the question of substantial similarity and to reject
Koons' puntative fair use defense to infringement liability on the grounds
of parody. 60
Here, the court searched for a genuine author (not an author-man-

que like Koons) and finding such a figure in Rogers, penalized Koons
whose use of Rogers' photographic image was literally "un-authorized."' 61 This case highlights copyright's bias toward rewarding clearly
demarcated individual authorship with property rights enfroceable
against later deviant authors who attempt to trespass without "authorization" on those rights. Koons' work deviated from the individual author model because: (1) it was a form of collective authorship, being
fabricated by different groups of art workers; and (2) it was a form of
serial collaboration, using pre-existing materials (such as Rogers' photo),
re-fashioning them in the manner of a bricoleur 62 to new parodistic ends
54. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304 ( "Defendant Jeff Koons is a 37-year-old artist and sculptor residing
in New York City.. . . While pursuing his career as an artist, he also worked until 1984 as a mutual
funds salesman, a registered commodities salesman, and broker, and a commodities futures broker
.... He is a controversial artist hailed by some as a 'modem Michelangelo,' while others find his
work truly offensive."); Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 306.
55. Koons, 960 F.2d at 303 ("[Rogers] makes his living by creating, exhibiting, publishing and
otherwise making use of his rights in his photographic works."); Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at
306.
56. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305 ("(Koons] gave his artisans one of Rogers' notecards and told them
to copy it."); Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 308.
57. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304-05; Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 308.
58. Koons, 960 F.2d at 303, 308 ("a typical American scene-a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of charming puppies... [with a] charming and unique character ....
); Jaszi, Author
Effect, supra note 4, at 308-09.
59. Koons, 960 F.2d at 305 ("[Koons] viewed [Rogers' photo] as part of the mass culture'resting in the collective sub-consciousness of people regardless of whether the card had actually ever
been seen by such people.' "); Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 308. See generally, John Carlin,
Note, Culture Vulturer Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 103, 111 (1988) ("The referent in post-Modem Art is no longer 'nature' but the closed
system of fabricated signs that make up our environment.").
60. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308, 310 ("The problem ... is that even given that 'String of Puppies' is
a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph
'Puppies' itself."); Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 311-12.
61. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 312.
62. Id. at 308 n.52, 312. Jacques Derrida notes that:
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quite different from those of the prior existing materials. Here, the court
would not let Rogers be turned into a mere "source," because he was so
clearly an author. Conversely, Koons could not be a legally sanctioned
63
author because he lacked the proper kind of "originality.1
In the 1991 case, Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.,64 another (and then quite prevalent) form of serial authorship, the later anthologizing of pre-existing materials by professors into tailored packets
for classroom use, came under fire as a group of eight publishers sued the
Kinko's copy shop chain. Jaszi points out that Kinko's involved a paradoxical abstracting of authorship by the court because none of the professors who had decided what such photocopied packets would contain (the
putative serial authors) were defendants in the case. 65 This authorial
vacuum made it easier for the Kinko's court to invoke the image of the
author (in the abstract) to find infringement on Kinko's part, because
"[I]n this case, there was absolutely no literary effort made by Kinko's to
expand upon or contextualize the materials copied.... The excerpts in
the suit were merely copied, bound into a new form, and sold. The plaintiffs refer to this process as "anthologizing."... [I]t required the judgment of the professors to compile it, though none of Kinko's. ' 66 This
disassociation between the "judgment" of the absent professors and "literary effort" (of which Kinko's possessed none), underlines the degree to
which the Kinko's court failed to focus on the substantial added social
value (to students, professors, universities, etc.) by the serial nature of the
author-like editorial decisions involved in tailoring, re-assembling, and
distributing particular groupings of materials to students in a new
form. 67 The court's concentration on the individualized author model
made it virtually impossible to see, let alone acknowledge the value of the
contributions made through such modes of deviant authorship. 68 Con[I]n The Savage Mind, [Levi-Strauss] presents .. . what he calls bricolage.... The
bricoleur,says Levi.Strauss, is someone who uses "the means at hand," that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not
been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to
which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it
appears necessary.
Derrida, supra note 37, at 285.
63. See Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 314.
64. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("Plaintiffs, all major publishing houses in New York City, brought this suit against Kinko's alleging
copyright infringement .... ."); see also Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 312-14.
65. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1532; Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 313 n.70.
66. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1530-31; Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 313.
67. Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1530 ("The copying was just that---copying-and did not 'transform' the works in suit, that is, interpret them or add any value to the material copied ....
");Jaszi,
Author Effect, supra note 4, at 314.
68. For a discussion of some of the significant social benefits which might attend "unauthor-
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tinuing our author/source analogy, because the professors were not
named defendants, there was no remotely plausible solitary authorial
candidate behind whom Kinko's could hide, whereas the publishers who
brought the suits were more convincing author-proxies because they possessed their "reified" copyrights. The persistent judicial reliance on author-reasoning as a method of resolving ambiguity and suppressing the
complexity of the world will have to be addressed by chastened copyright
scholars as a necessary preliminary to importation of the textual strategies suggested by the Rotstein article.
B.

Authorship, Moral Rights, and "Tilted Arc" as Textual Event

Another front on which the image of the Romantic author (and related vision of clearly individuated originality) is reascendant can be seen
in the increased legal interest in artists' "moral rights" legislation (both
on the federal and state levels). 69 Traditionally, American copyright law
has not separately protected an author's or artist's "moral rights" of integrity or attribution 70 because, theoretically, an exclusive copyright allowed authors and artists to bargain for these rights contractually. 71 The
ized" copying like that at issue in Kinko's, such as increased competition bringing about lower consumer prices and more widespread dissemination and use of intellectual works, see Stephen Breyer,
The Uneasy Casefor Copyright A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies; and ComputerPrograms, 84 HARv.L. REv. 281 (1970). Breyer also argues that:
[S]pecial consideration for authors rests upon an intuitive, unanalyzed feeling that an author's book is his "property." But why do we have such a feeling? An intellectual creation
differs radically from land and chattels. Since ideas are infinitely divisible, property rights
are not needed to prevent congestion, interference, or strife. Nor does the fact that the
book is the author's creation seem a sufficient reason for making it his property. We do not
ordinarily create or modify property rights, nor even award compensation, solely on the
basis of labor expended.
Id. at 288-89. See also Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA
167 n.5 (1934).
69. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 298-99; Jaszi, Metamorphoses, supra note 4, at 496500; see also CHLsUM, supra note 19, at § 4E[6][a][b]; Robin A. Morris, ExpandingProprietaryEntitiements and the PublicInterest in Disseminationof Art, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ.269 (1989).
70. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128, 5128-5129 (1990)
[hereinafter Visual Artists Act] (defining the right of integrity as "any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation," and the right of attribution as a right to claim authorship of a work and prevent use of his or
her name on visual art works he or she did not create, and the right to prevent use of his or her name
on a work "in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.").
71. The Second Circuit has noted that:
[An author's economic right to control preparation of derivative works could be used in
such a way so as to prevent mutilation of such works: "American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights... since the law seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal rights of authors .... Thus courts have long granted
relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories outside the statutory
law of copyright, such as contract law.., or the tort of unfair competition ....
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
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rise of "moral rights" legislation in the U.S. is interesting because, unlike
the other sticks in the marketable "bundle of rights" comprising a copyright, "moral rights" are inalienable (but may be waived). When coupled
with the copyright monopoly, this upsurge of interest in artists' "moral
rights" seems to indicate that we doubly reward the creativity and originality of the clearly individuated artist (here, as a proxy for the Romantic
author) first, with copyright as an economic reward for disclosing her
creative labor to society, and, second, with inalienable "moral rights"
72
arising from recognition of the uniqueness of her personality.
In 198873 the U.S. acceded to the Berne Convention but took an
extremely minimal posture towards compliance, partly because of the
strong opposition of the copyright industry. 74 Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention requires member countries to recognize certain baseline
"moral rights" of creators, such as rights of attribution and integrity.7 5
The minimalist U.S. posture towards "moral rights" manifested itself in
a very ambivalent attitude towards how, if at all, attribution or integrity
76
rights of authors should develop in American intellecutal property law.
This vacillation was exemplified by a Congressional statement accompanying the Berne accession that: (1) accession to the Berne Convention
neither created nor affected any existing federal, state, or common law
rights of attribution or integrity; 77 and (2) the "totality of U.S. law provide for the rights of paternity and integrity sufficient [for compliance
72. 1 JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETmCS, AND THE VisuAL ARTS 145
(2d ed. 1987) ("The primary justification for the protection of moral rights is the idea that the work
of art is the extension of the artist's personality, an expression of his most innermost being. To
mistreat the work of art is to mistreat the artist... to impair his personality.").
73. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
74. Berne Implementation Act of1987 Hearingson -.R. 1623 Before the House JudiciarySubcomm. on Court; Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm.,
100th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 331-84 (1988) (statement on behalf of the Coalition to Preserve the
American Copyright Tradition).
75. Article 6bis reads in part:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or any other derogatory action in relation
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text, 1971).
76. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., BERNE IMPLEMENTATION AcT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 609,

100th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1988); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568 § 3(b), 102 Stat. 2853.
77. The statement explains that:
The law relating to the rights of paternity and integrity is intended to be the same the day
before, and the day after, adherence. Courts remain free to apply common law principles,
to interpret statutory provisions, and to consider the experience of foreign countries to the
same extent as they would be in the absence of United States adherence to Berne.
H.R. REP. 100-609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-40 (1988).
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with the Berne Convention]." 78
However, despite this marked equivocality toward the question of
"moral rights," Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990,79 providing limited attribution and integrity rights for visual artists
who create graphic, sculptural, or photographic works, either in original
or limited editions. 80 Eleven states currently have some type of "moral
rights" statute, 8 1 which may be partly pre-empted by the federal Visual
Artists Rights Act.8 2 However, these statutes show there is some support for the idea that the "moral rights" of creators in their original
'8 3
works are somehow "special."
The reaffirmation of the importance of the relationship between the
author and her work represented by the upsurge of interest in "moral
rights" statutes inveighs against claims of the death of the author and the
dissolution of the idea of the work. Indeed, these statutes seem not only
to reaffirm the property-based "thingification" of an author's work, but
also justify a hierarchy, in which the author is empowered to "freeze" a
specific interpretation of a work's meaning, even following transfer of her
84
property rights in the work.
While not a copyright case, the controversy surrounding Richard
Serra's public sculpture entitled "Tilted Arc," illustrates some problems
arising at the intersection (more like collision) of "textual indeterminacy," audience-oriented "recoding" rights, and the elevation of individual authorship as exemplified by the idea of artists' "moral rights."
Briefly, in 1979 Serra was commissioned by the General Services Admin78. Id. at 20.
79. Visual Artists Act, supra note 70, § 101 (excluding a broad listing of commercial materials
produced for a mass market).
80. Id.
81. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-990 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 42-116s to
42-116t (West 1992); 815 ILCS 320/1-320/8 (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151 to 51:2156
(West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231,
§§ 85s (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-l to 2A:24-8 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 56-11-1 to 56-11-3 (Michie 1988); N.Y. ARTs & CULT. AFF.LAW §§ 11.01-16.01 (McKinney
Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 55-62-2 to 5-626 (1987); see CHSUM, supra note 19, at § 4E[6][a].
82. See, eg., Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compo Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989).
83. See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (New York
Artists' Authorship Rights Act used by court to grant artist injunctive relief against the American
Family Association which had reprinted decontextualized fragments of David Wojnarowicz's work
in an anti-NEA funding pamphlet).
84. In a somewhat similar, but not altogether congruous fashion, in the context of trademark
laws, state anti-dilution laws grant the owners of a mark a similar strong power to "freeze" a mark's
meaning, even in the absence of consumer confusion. See Coombe, supra note 1, at 1855; see also
CHISUM, supra note 19, at § 6G[3][a]; Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationalesfor the Protectionof TradeSymbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158.
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istration (GSA) to create a site-specific sculpture for Federal Plaza in
lower Manhattan, next to where the Jacob Javits Federal Building was to
be built.3 5 Over the next few years, Serra developed the idea for Tilted
Are, which was to be made of 3-inch thick Cor-Ten steel (which acquires
a permanent coat of rust). Tilted Arc was to be 12-feet high and 120 feet
long, and would stretch diagonally at a tilt of 1 foot off its vertical axis
across the space of Federal Plaza. 6 In 1981, Tilted Arc was installed.
Soon after, thousands of office workers and neighborhood residents began complaining about and protesting its presence. These protests
culminated in a series of petitions for the removal of Tilted Are, signed
by 1,500 workers from the area surrounding the plaza. 7
Objections to the Serra's work focused on: (1) its aesthetics ("ugly,
brutal and intimidating"); 8 (2) its placement (Tilted Arc destroyed Federal Plaza as an open pedestrian space by diagonally bisecting it, cutting
off views of the surrounding historical Foley Square area);8 9 (3) safety
(the work invited graffiti and was a security hazard, supposedly providing muggers and vagrants places to hide);90 and (4) the "moral rights" of
the Federal Plaza architects were violated because Serra had not worked
in conjunction or consultation with the architects (Serra had deliberately
set out to confront the architectural concept of the plaza as an open
space).
In 1988, following years of various public hearings 91 on the propri-

ety of Tilted Arc's existence in situ, the GSA ordered the work's removal. Serra argued in federal court for an injunction against Tilted
Arc's removal on the grounds that such removal abridged his First
Amendment speech rights, his Fifth Amendment due process rights and

his artist's "moral rights."' 92 However, the court refused to issue an in-

junction and Tilted Arc was hauled away to a government-owned motor
storage area in Brooklyn in March, 1989. 93
While Serra, and by extension, the idea of artists' "moral rights,"
85. See, e.g., MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note 72, at 358-63; ALVIN KERNAN, THE DEATH OF
LITERATURE 96-97 (1990); Calvin Tomkins, "2ltedArc,"THE NEw YORKER, May 20, 1985, at 95101; Alvin S. Lane, Public Art v. Public Sentiment, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1985, at 21; Richard Serra,
"Tilted Arc" Destroyed, ART IN AM., May 1989, at 34.
86. MERRYMAN & EiSEN, supra note 72, at 358.
87. Id. at 360.
88. Id. at 361.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. KERNAN, supra note 85, at 96.
92. Id.
93. Id. See also Serra v. General Services Administration, 847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1988)
(Affirming denial of injunction against removal of Serra's sculpture on the grounds that Serra had
relinquished any speech rights related to Tilted Arc when he sold the work unconditionally to the
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suffered a setback in this sitqation, it is important to note that while the
broad-based expansion of such artists' "moral rights" (including use of
copyright law to protect an author's unpublished writings 94) may benefit
some artists or authors, the other side of such expanded legal protections
is that one only benefits from such heightened protections if one is legally
categorized as an author or an artist. If one does not fit the authorial
model it may be difficult (though as Tilted Arc shows, not impossible) to
articulate how expansion of an author's legal autonomy may negatively
impact the equally valid interests of an audience in having input as to the
interpretation and disposition of such a work. 95
These events show that the image of the Romantic author-genius
who creates an original work is still a potent, but extremely problematic
image in our intellectual property law (that is in the clash of Serra's and
the architect's "moral rights," whose claim is more privileged? Will the
"real" author please stand up?). However, this situation also shows how
the interests of producers of works and audiences may diverge sharply on
the terrain of a "text." Furthermore, Tilted Arc indicates how a narrow
conception of individual authorship, such as that exemplified by the concept of artists' "moral rights" may collide with audience-oriented
"recoding" rights, turning the "intertext" into a hotly contested battle
zone of opposed and competing interpretations battling for control of a
context's meaning (in this situation to "recode" the work meant imposing a praticular audience's negative interpretation of Tilted Arc thereby
transforming the "text" of Federal Plaza by having Tilted Arc
96
removed).
GSA, and the GSA was entitled to do what it wished with the sculpture, including removing it from
Federal Plaza); See also Morris, supra note 69, at 277 n.40.
94. See, eg., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); New Era
Publications Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir: 1990); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 1993 WL 7576
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1992). But cf.Wright v. Warner Books, Inc. 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (Holding that defendant's unauthorized takings from unpublished letters and diaries of the writer Richard
Wright were partially a fair use-some of the materials (out of ten items, six were "authorial" and
protected, four were mundane and non-copyrightable) were held by the court to only contain mundane details which were not the subject matter of copyright.). See also the 1992 Amendment to
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976; H.R. REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992)
(amending the fair use provision to read, "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.").
95. Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1532 n.304.
96. Although defining an audience as a delimited entity may be similarly problematic. There
were at least four or five "interpretive communities": the workers and residents; the government
administrators and bureaucrats who were petitioned for the work's removal; the contemporary art
world; the media; the hypothecated community of vandals, vagrants, and graffiti artists; as well as
the presumable minority of workers and residents who either liked or were indifferent to Tilted Arc.
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C.

Authorship, Texts, and Boyle on Spleens

James Boyle has suggested that one reason why author-reasoning
has proved to be so resilient is that it manages to do a fairly good job of
suppressing the messiness of the world. 97 In a recent article, Boyle discusses how author-reasoning has been deployed in legal areas outside
copyright law, showing how these areas (for example, insider trading
law, blackmail, publicity rights, and the law of property in genetic materials) use slightly modified forms of the copyright triumvirate-the author, originality, and the idea/expression dichotomy-to generate
ostensibly stable justifications for patterns of property rights and entitle-

ments. 98 Boyle's fascinating article is far too elegantly reasoned and

richly textured to summarize here, however, I would like to mention one
particular example which he discusses (at much greater length) to
demonstrate the pervasiveness of author-reasoning. 99
The question Boyle raises is: who owns the property rights to genetic information encoded in a particular person's cellular DNA? The
particular person? A doctor who discovers a new use for such information? No one? Everyone? For an answer to this question, Boyle uses the
1990 California case, Moore v. Regents of The University of California,OG
to show how the image of originary Romantic authorship can justify, as
well as deny, property rights in genetic information. In Moore, doctorresearchers at the University of California Medical Center excised a cancerous spleen from John Moore in the late 1970s during the course of
treating Mr. Moore for a rare form of hairy-cell leukemia. 10 1 Without
informing Moore of their plans, the doctors established and patented (in
97. See Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1461.
98. Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1461-70, 1525-34.
99, Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1429-32, 1508-20.
100. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991); Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1429-32, 1508-20; see also
Thomas P. Dillon, Note. Source Compensationfor Tissues and Cells Used in BiotechnologicalRe-

search: Why a Source Shouldn't Sharein the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 628 (1989); Alan R.
Geraldi, In His Image: On Patenting Human-Based Bioproducts, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 583 (1991);
Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of Human Cells
Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
211 (1989); Stephen A. Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University of
California and the Right to Sell Partsof Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L. REV. 499 (1990); see generally
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP
OF HUMAN TISuEs AND CELLS (1987); Kevin D. DeBr, Note, Patents on People and the U.S
Constitution. CreatingSlaves or EnslavingScience?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221 (1989).

101. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482; Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1430; Maureen S.
Dorney, Comment, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Balancing the Need for Biotechnology Innovation Against the Right of Informed Consent, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 333, 339 n.36
(1990) (noting that while a normal human spleen weighs a half pound, Mr. Moore's weighed twentytwo pounds).
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the university's name) a lucrative cell line of T-lymphocytes from a section of the excised spleen.10 2 When Moore eventually found out about
the huge commercial value of his excised spleen cells, he filed a state law
claim for the tort of conversion (amongst others) against the doctors and
03
the university.1

In rejecting Moore's conversion claim and reaffirming the university's property rights in the patented cell line, Boyle argues that the California Supreme Court used a close analog to author-reasoning to (1) deny
property rights in products literally composed of Moore's own genetic
material because he was a mere "source" (that is, he lacked sufficient
"originality" to qualify as an author, and therefore, owner, of the genetic
material in question); °4 and (2) affirm the patent property rights of the
university in Moore's genetic materials because its researchers exercised
"ingenuity," artistry, and "inventive effort" (in other words, authorial
originality) to create something original from "naturally occurring raw
materials,"'' 0 5 which in Moore's case happened to be the genetic information encoded in his spleen cells.
Because of the premium that the concept of Romantic authorship
places on originality, Boyle, like Jaszi, claims that sources become discounted, obscured, invisible, and are conceived of as being "up for grabs"
for the industrious and inventive.' 0 6 On the tendency of author-reasoning to cut up the world into deserving, original "authors" and undeserving, unoriginal "sources," Boyle writes:
[T]he Moore case may indicate both the contentious value judgments
loaded into the conceptual apparatus of authorship and the way that
discussions of entitlement to control information are carried out
through the metaphor of "authorship," even in fields far from copyright. Seen this way, Mr. Moore's case almost seems to be designed to
fail the authorship test. The court thinks that his rights are already
too limited to be property, that his genetic information is too natural to
be a creation, that it is neither private enough to be protected by the
102. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482; Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1430.
103. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492; Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1431.
104. Moore, 793 P.2d at 490 (pointing out the lack of originality in Moore's excised genetic
material by characterizing it as "no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine
or the chemical formula of hemoglobin."); Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1432 n.37.
105. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-93 (citation omitted). Boyle notes that:
[The subject matter of the Regents' patent-the patented cell line and the products derived from it-cannot be Moore's property.... Federal law permits the patenting of organisms that represent the product of "human ingenuity," but not naturally occurring
organisms. Human cell lines are patentable because l]ong-term adaption and growth of
human tissues and cells in culture is difficult-often considered an art .. " Itis this
inventive effort that patent law rewards, not the discovery of naturally occurring raw
materials.
Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1528.
. 106. Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1533-34.
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law of privacy nor original or creative enough to be protected by the
rights of publicity.... The scientists, however, with their transformative, Faustian artistry, fit the model of original, creative labor. For
them, property rights are necessary to encourage research.10 7

What does the preceding discussion of author-reasoning in the copyright, "moral rights," and property rights in human genetic material
have to do with importation of poststructuralist textual strategies of contemporary literary criticism into copyright law? For one, these examples
show the depth and breadth to which the author concept is entrenched.1 08 Simply ignoring or dismissing authorship as a mere peculiar
historical formation whose time has long since come and gone would be a
mistake in trying to reconstruct a chastened regime of copyright which
assimilates the insights of contemporary literary theory. Because such
literary theory takes the disappearance of the author as a given, assimilating such theory into copyright tends to underestimate the extent to
which images of clearly individuated, orginary authorship is deeply embedded in our legal system. Contemporary literary theory qua copyright
law must first recognize this pervasiveness, if only to demystify authorship. Authorship as a justification for granting exclusive monopoly-type
rights (in the midst of a system such as ours, which is supposedly premised on competition) disables our ability to recognize the contribution
of "sources" (as in Feist and Moore) and discounts the interpretative and

other interests of "audiences" and other downstream uses (as in Koons,
Kinko's and Tilted Arc). Authorship must be accounted for if it is to be

criticized and reformulated.10 9
Thus, Peter Jaszi argues that courts adjudicating copyright cases
107. Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1519.
108. David Lange states:
I think Foucault has it exactly backward. I think (that] authorship ... will survive, though
in radically personal form, and the constraining figure of societal (or state) authority that
will vanish-and with it, in all likelihood, intellectual property as we know it.... Authorship as an artifact of authority is indefensible; it deserves to die. But authorship in the
preliminary sense of identifying, merely entre nous, the "person to whom something owes
its origin" is not only defensible, but inevitable as well. Indeed, I would venture to say it
has been an essential requirement of human existence from our earliest beginnings.
Lange, At Play, supra note 4, at 148.
109. James Boyle claims that:
[Tihere are a number of things the authorship vision does well. It conceals the indeterminacy of much of the utilitarian analysis.... Authors and inventors often do need to be
encouraged, protected, lauded, and rewarded. The romantic vision of authorship offers an
attractive idea of creative labor-transcending market norms, incorporating both work and
play, and entailing a world in which workers have a real connection to and control over the
fruits of their labors. This is a vision that we might want to expand far beyond the limited
realm of property in information. As currently constructed however, intellectual property
in particular and information issues in general seem to be in the thrall of an idea that is
taken as truth where it should be questioned as dogma.
Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4, at 1534.
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should consider a wider range of alternate constructions of authorship.
A more expansive vision of authorship would be able to more coherently
account for the increasingly common multiple, collective, and serial
forms of authorship which already exist,110 or are only now coming into
being, made possible in part by the introduction of new information, storage, communication, and processing technologies.'
Jaszi and Boyle
converge on the notion that our traditional model of clearly individuated,
originary Romantic authorship has had a nasty way of making contributions, and contributors (including readers and audiences reconceived as
textual co-authors, collaborators, and co-creators) that cannot be conceived of as possessing authorial originality into passive "sources." This
makes certain potentially valuable cultural and social activities illegal, as
in Kinko's or Koons, or simply seem non-existent, as in Feist.11 2 If it
turns out to be that "sources" have been, can be, and are also authors,
the concept of authorship begins diffusing and the "author"-itarian (in
the sense of one who polices a text's meaning) character of authorship
begins losing much of its occlusive power.
Closely examining and criticizing current formulations of legal authorship relates to Rotstein's suggestion that copyright law should adopt
a textual strategy focused on "texts" as dynamic processes rather than
static "works." Radically expanding the concept of authorship by ac110. For example, lawyers at large firms frequently collect and freely exchange both firm-approved and non-approved forms of corporate documents and briefs. These are exchanged within the
firm and with lawyers in other firms. These documents are marked up and tailored to the specifics of
a particular case or client. Who is the author? And when does a mark-up of a prior document
assume a new identity? The existence of such a serial, collective, scribal practice at the heart of the
legal profession is surprising. See also KAPLAN, supra note 43, at 64-65 (discussing Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1958), in which a court upheld copyright in legal
forms used by an insurance company. Kaplan wrote, "Mhe effect of the decision may be to force
users to awkward and possibly dangerous recasting of legal language to avoid infringement actions."
Id. at 65.) See also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of IntellectualProperty, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 321
(1988) (observing that certain kinds of legal language should be beyond privatization).
111. Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4, at 319-20 (discussing dire consequences which might
attend the unthinking application of intellectual property laws based on the individualist model of
authorship in a developing electronic environment like the Internet, in which new interactive, collaborative, collective, and serial possibilities of authorship have emerged); see also DAVID BOLTER, THE
(1991); CYBERSPACE: FIRST STEPS (Michael Benedikt ed., 1991); POSTER, supra note 7; BRUCE STERLING, THE
HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1992); WoodmanWRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF WRITING

see, supra note 4, at 289-91 (discussing the dissolution of barriers between readers and authors
brought about by new computer technologies); Brian Eno, On Writing Space, ARTFORUM, Nov.
1991, at 13; see also Arthur R. Miller, CopyrightProtectionfor Computer Programs,Databases,and
Computer-Generated Works:- Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L REv. 977, 1056-72
(1993) (discussing the relation between legal authorship and works generated via artificial intelligence computer programs).
112. Jaszi,AuthorEffect, supra note 4, at 302 (discussing folkloric works); Boyle, Law and Infor-

mation, supra note 4, at 1529-33 (discussing dire environmental and cultural costs of failing to recognize the contributions of "sources" which do not fit a Western individualist authorship model).

ADRIFT IN THE INTER TEXT

19931

counting and arguing for legal acknowledgement of a wider range of alternate authorship possibilities works to break up the image of the
individuated Romantic author, opening up the possibility that a chastened copyright regime may then be able to reconceive of texts as fluid
events, with dynamic inputs coming in, feeding back and intersecting at

multiple loci.
This section has discussed the resurgence of author-reasoning in re-

cent statutes and cases arising in the areas of copyright, "moral rights,"
and patent rights. The author is a powerful metaphor as well as a metaphor for power ("author"-ize, "author"-ity, "auth"-entic, etc.), and as
1 16
James Boyle,11 3 Peter Jaszi,1 1 4 Martha Woodmansee,1 1 5 Mark Rose,
and many others have stressed in many ways, to transform the valence of
that power, we must first understand how the figure of the author continues working to constrict what legal thought considers to be a threatening
proliferation of meaning.

IV. EVENTS OF SPEECH AS AUDIENCE "RECODING" RIGHTS
Copyright has been frequently and repeatedly characterized as property, and, indeed, is grouped and generally taught under the rubric of
intellectual property.1 17 This does not necessarily make it so, but it affects the texture of copyright discourse, in part because the idea of property is itself problematic. 1 " Like the author, the idea of property has
been discussed, dichotomized, dissected, deconstructed, and declared
dead; defended, debunked, proclaimed to be no more than a bundle of
rights; been revived like Frankenstein; been justified as dessert, incentive,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Boyle, Law and Information, supra note 4.
Jaszi, Author Effect, supra note 4; Jaszi, Metamorphoses,supra note 4.
Woodmansee, supra note 4; Woodmansee, supra note 38, at 17.
Rose, supra note 38.
See, eg., Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual PropertyIs Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 97 (1990); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv.

1659 (1987); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis.
tency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) [hereinafter Gordon, An
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright]; Wendy . Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Benefit" The
Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship,57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1009 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Toward a JurisprudenceofBenefits]; Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying IntellectualProperty, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989); Hughes, supra note 110; Edmund Kitch, Property Rights in
Inventions, Writingsand Marks, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (1990); Alfred Yen, Restoringthe
NaturalLaw: Copyright as Laborand Possession, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). But cf., Breyer, supra
note 68; Tom G. Palmer, IntellectualProperty. A Non-PosnerianLaw and Economics Approach, 12
HAMLINE L. REv. 261 (1989).
118. For a particularly incisive discussion on how patterns of entitlement in copyright (imspite
of intangibility) closely resemble such patterns in the law pertaining to physicalist property and tort
law, as well as an insightful application of Wesley Hohfeld's jural correlatives (rights, privileges,
duties, and powers) to the entitlement structures of copyright law, see Gordon, An Inquiry into the
Merits of Copyright, supra note 117, at 1365-77.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:805

an internalization of externalities, shield against the state, shield against
other people, constitutive element of personhood; and seen as public, private, relative, real, personal, physicalist, absolute, pre-political, and so
on.' 1 9 This Rorschach-like tendency of the idea of property becomes exacerbated in the realm of intellectual property.
Rotstein presents us with an interesting approach to copyright:
depropertize it to a great degree by deobjectifying what has been its central focus, the discrete "work," and reconceive copyright's subject as a
fluid "text."' 20 Thus, to the extent that "texts" are to be depropertized,
they would assume a greater "public" character. The idea of text-asspeech-event is like the sword cutting through the Gordian knot that
copyright as costive regime of property has wound itself into, transforming copyright into a chastened regime of speech regulation. This approach has many advantages. For one, in the area of copyright,
trademark, and publicity rights, the characterization of an interest as private property seems to bring about great judicial deference along with the
tendency to discount the relevance of competing public First Amendment speech values. This is particularly so if the context of the claimed
expressive use is commercial, which is judicially conceived of as occurring in the realm of "private" market relations, and therefore not subject
to the same scrutiny as actions occurring in the "public" realm of the
polity.' 2' By diluting the "property-ness" of interests protected by copy119. The literature on justifications for and arguments against property rights is so voluminous
that I could not even begin citing it here. However, there are a few pieces I would like to single out,

see, eg., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); Cohen,
supra note 6; Morris R_ Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Duncan Kennedy & Frank I. Michelman, Are Property and ContractEfficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980);
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 209 (1979); Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in AnalyticalJurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 975; Kenneth Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Develop.
ment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325 (1980); Charles A. Reich, The New

Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
120. I realize I am using a very strong form of Rotstein's points. Insofar as he is interested in dereifying the "work," I am assuming that a de-reified "work" is de-propertized to the extent that it
becomes more difficult in determining boundary-crossings (or violations of exclusivity, which is the
intellectual property equivalent of boundary-crossing). It is the strong form of textual strategies that
I am using to imagine how copyright would look as a speech-regulation set of rights or entitlements,
rather than a property regime.
121. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change v. American Heritage Prods., 694
F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983) (sale of busts of Martin Luther King, Jr. violated right of publicity); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., O'Neill v. Walt
Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (underground comic book parody of Disney characters infringed Disney copyright in characters); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., Inc., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (special trademark legislation allowed USOC to bar unauthorized
group from using world "Olympics"); Waits v. Frito-lay, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17675 (9th
Cir. August 5, 1992) (singer Tom Waits awarded $2.6 million in damages against company which
used sound-alike singer in commercial); White v. Samsung Electronics, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395; 1992
U.S.App. LEXIS 17205 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that advertisement with a blond female robot on the
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right, an approach focusing on texts-as-speech-events would begin al-

lowing space for a judicial consideration of "recoded"

cultural

productions and enhanced respect for free speech values.
There are, however, at least three problematic areas to such an approach (which I will only briefly touch on here): (1) conservative opposition (the "when I hear the word deconstruction, I reach for my gun"
approach); (2) potential for abuse and perverse application (the "sword
cuts both ways" argument); (3) commercialization of intertextual expressions (the "opening up of new areas for exploitation only sets the stage
for a gold rush" argument). All of these problematic areas, however,
have more than one side-that is, they also present opportunities for
development.
A.

Conservative Opposition

The first objection to such potential de-propertization and recognition of audience "recoding" rights, which poststructuralist approaches
may seem to imply, is put this way by Richard Posner:
The thread that connects the various schools of poststructuralism is
their determination to reverse the traditional primacy of author over
reader in the interpretation of texts. From such a reversal the advocates of free interpretation of legal texts draw aid and comfort, while
believers in the objectivity of law are discomfited. A related feature of
poststructuralism is that most of its practitioners are political radicals,
who see their attack on objective interpretation as part of a broader
campaign against bourgeois thought, one element of which is belief in

the rule of law ....

122

"Wheel of Fortune" TV show set had "taken" Vanna White's identity); but cf. White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4928 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, I., dissenting
from denial of rehearing, and lambasting the 9th Circuit for wholesale expansion of celebrity rights
to publicity); see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L. J. 1553 (forthcoming 1993); Gordon, Toward a JurisprudenceofBenefit. supra note 117, at.103037.
122. POSNER, s'upra note 2, at 216 (citations omitted); see also the comments of Owen Fiss:
Nihilism is also fashionable in literary criticism today and is represented there by what I
referred to as the deconstruction movement.... Deconstructionists reject the idea of objectivity in interpretation .... For them interpretive freedom is absolute.... There can be
many schools of literary interpretation, but ... in legal interpretation there is only one
school and attendance is mandatory.
Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,in INTERPRETING LAW AND LrrERATURE, supra note 2,
234-35. Compare the comments of Pierre Schlag:
Many commentators see postmodernism as lacking any particular politics. In fact, however, they are unable to recognize or identify the politics of postmodernism because they
try and locate postnodernism within the orthodox matrices of a very traditional conception of politics-a conception that accepts at face value the traditional characterizations of
right and left, a conception that implicitly and automatically equates politics with making
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In other words, when Judge Posner hears the word "deconstruction," he is (perhaps rightly) suspicious of subversive agendas which have
apparently arrayed themselves in a dispersed constellation around poststructuralism. My point is that arguments over interpretive methodology in the law in general have been intensely politicized, fracturing into
opposing "interpretive communities" of originalists, intentionalists,
deconstructionists, and who knows what else. 12 3 Because of this polarization and unruly pluralism of approaches to the idea of law as literature,
it seems likely that consensus would be hard to reach among judges and
academics about whether and to what degree copyright should assimilate
poststructuralist literary criticism, even when dealing with literature as
literature.' 24 Even poststructuralism itself is profoundly contradictory
and divided as to the types and extent of textual strategies and practices
to be deployed in interpreting a text. 25 We are looking at a highly fragmented, internally fractured, and politically charged methodology (consensus should not be presumed), and we are also facing considerable and
likely conservative political and legal opposition to the use of poststructural literary techniques and likely copyright courts in ways that cut
back, restrict, transform, reshape, or otherwise recharacterize what
proprietors had come to think of as "their" property. Conservatives and
libertarians are likely to look with abject horror on such
value choices .... Within the matrices of this traditional--indeedfundamentalist--conception of politics, it is easy to miss the politics of postmodernism precisely because the
politics of postmodernism are to decenter and displace this traditional conception of
politics.
Schlag, Normative & Nowhere to Go, supra note 2, at 169 n.7; see also Joseph W. Singer, The Player
and the Cardv"Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); cf.John Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986).
123. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN L. REv. 739 (1982) with
Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, in FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 2, at 120; compare
Edwin Meese III, Address Before the D.C Chapter of the Federalist Society, in INTERPRETING LAW
AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 25 with William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
Stater Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 2;
compare Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framer's Intention, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 45 with Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 2, at 69.

124. Consensus may not even exist within the same person, for example Richard Posner argues
"that it is possible to be a New Critic when interpreting literature and intentionalist when interpreting law." POSNER, supra note 2, at 211.
125. 1 am using the word "poststructuralism" as polymorphously overlapping some of the practices associated with "postmodernism." FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM xxii (1991) ("As for postmodernism itself, I have not tried to

systematize a usage or to impose any conveniently coherent thumbnail meaning, for the concept is
not merely contested, it is also internally conflicted and contradictory ....[F]or good or ill, we
cannot not use it."); see eg., HUTCHEON supra note 7, at 11 (discussing the coreless-ness of
postmodernism (from Frederic Jameson to Jean-Frangois Lyotard to Brian McHale, and so on) and
asking the question, "Whose Postmodernism?").
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recharacterization. 126
The second objection is, as Judge Posner pointed out, that there is
an oppositional spin in textual approaches that want to dethrone the author's primacy over a work and reconstitute readers as co-creators of a
"textual event." However, insofar as deconstructionalist textual approaches are imported into copyright law, practitioners of such approaches risk being defanged and co-opted, or as Pierre Schlag puts it,
If traditional legal discourse succeeds in transforming deconstruction
into just another technique, just another theory, just another method
for making arguments,... (d]econstruction will become powerless to
subvert and displace the categorical regime.. .- the one that systematically transforms intellectual endeavors into just another method....
But to transform deconstruction into any of these things is to turn
deconstruction into precisely what it seeks to resist and displace. To
transform deconstruction into a theory, etc. is to relocate deconstruction and confine it to the already logcentric matrices of traditional
legal thought ....The error here is the homogenization and neutrali-

zation of the different subversiveness of deconstruction through its assimilation with approaches that have already been reduced to the
status of mere theories, techniques, methods, etc. 127

Thus, to the extent that deconstructionist approaches to the text become domesticated and are placed in service of the Rule of Law,12 they
stand to lose the very ability to subvert traditional legal thought which
may have made them appealing (to oppositionalists, at least) in the first
place.
Additionally, the media and copyright-based industries are unlikely
to sit quietly by as audience "recoding" rights are advanced, which
would erode the value of their media properties due to decreased exclusivity. It is precisely the "property" aspect of intellectual property, that
is, the right to exclude (actually the right to prohibit unauthorized downstream uses), that keeps the barely-suppressed "public goods" problem
(the impossibility of exclusion and jointness of supply) of intangible
goods from popping out.1 29 Implementing poststructuralist textual strat126. See, eg., AYN RAND, CAPrTAusM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 128 (1966) C'[P]atents are the
heart and core of property rights, and once... they are destroyed, the destruction of all other rights
will follow automatically, as a brief postscript."); Easterbrook, supra note 117; Kitch, supra note
117. For a staunch libertarian defense of private property rights in general, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

127. Schlag, The Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 1636-37.
128. See, e-g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.REV. 1175
(1989).
129. See, eg., Kenneth J.Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC SOCIAL FACTORS 609
(National Bureau of Economic Research 1962); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J.L. &ECoN. 293, 295 (1970); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory ofPublicExpenditure,
36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
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egies in copyright law may shrink the areas from which producers may
legitimately prevent unauthorized "recodings." The "lack of sufficient
incentives" to creators and producers argument will inevitably be
deployed by the mass-media and copyright industries to staunch any perceived threat to the value of their intellectual properties brought about by
increasing the scope of legally permitted, but unauthorized uses of such
properties.
The power of the copyright and media industries should not be underestimated. Ben Bagdikian has noted that by the 1980s, while there
are more than 25,000 outlets for the mass media, "the majority of all
major American media-newspapers, magazines, radio, television, books
and movies-were controlled by fifty giant corporations." 130 This trend
towards concentration of media control accelerated during the 1980s, as
already large corporations became conglomerates through diversification
or merger (for example, MCA/Universal, Time Warner, Inc., and Disney) or by absorption (for example, Twentieth Century Fox by News,
Ltd., and MGM/UA by the Quintex Group, Paramount by Gulf &
Western and Columbia by Coca-Cola).1 31 Maintaining strong copyrights
and trademarks is considered essential to the continuing competitive economic strength of these conglomerates, so, ironically, the more widely
their properties are disseminated to the public, the more "privatized"
becomes the control over possible uses of such products.
I am not suggesting that media conglomerates are involved in a sinister conspiracy to do anything,but I am suggesting that if changes in our
intellectual property laws seem headed in ways which will reduce legal
protections of their properties, these powerful proprietors have ample resources to oppose such changes. I might add, that while such media
industry opposition is not unprecedented, it is not always completely sue130. BEN H. BAGDIKiAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY Xv, xvi, 4 (1983). See also AMERICAN MEDIA AND MASS CULTURE: LEFT PERSPECTIVES (Donald Lazere ed., 1987); HERBERT I. SCHILLER,

CULTURE, INC.: THE COIORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION 35 (1989) ("A prediction
made in the mid-1980s that by 1995 almost 90 percent of all communication facilities (including
newspapers, broadcast outlets, cable systems, telephone lines, relays and satellites) would be in the
hands of fifteen companies is close to realization well before that date."). See also the comments of
Allan Hutchinson:
From McDonald's to General Motors and Sears to CBS, corporations are the primary loci
for socio-economic decisions and policymaking; how we put food on the table, what food
we put on the table, what we pay to put food on the table, what food we think we should
put on the table are all questions... that are shaped by corporations ....[L]arge sections
of the ruling elite.., remain beyond the reach of popular control and the grasp of electoral
accountability.
Allan C. Hutchinson, Talking the Good Lif" From FreeSpeech to DemocraticDialogue, 1 YALE J.L.
& LIB. 28 (1989)
131. See generally Mae D. Heuttig, Economic Control of the Motion Picture Industry, in THE
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 285 (Tino Balio ed., 1985).
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cessful. For example, despite the opposition of the copyright and media
industries (exemplified by a lobbying group such as The Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright Tradition) to the U.S. accession to the
international Berne Convention-primarily because of Berne's baseline
"moral rights" requirement-the U.S. became a Berne member in 1988,
albeit with a firmly minimalist posture. 13 2 The point here is that any
broad judicial or legislative approach incorporating aspects of audience
"recoding" rights will face a struggle on the social field of the law, however, such a struggle over contested cultural meaning may not be altogether a bad thing.
B.

Speech Regulation as Two-Edged Sword

The second problematic area in applying textual strategies to copyright arises from the way that, in Benjamin Kaplan's words, "copyright
has the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of censorship." 133 Assimilation of aspects of contemporary literary criticism into
copyright law does not necessarily translate into increased First Amendment speech rights, particularly given the tendency for what J.M. Balkin
has termed "ideological drift." 134 Assuming that such a speech regulation regime (as opposed to the current property-based regime) were implemented, it does not follow that all copyright decisions would be in
favor of audience-based "recoding" rights. In fact, the legitimacy of such
a regime would turn, in part, on the prohibition of certain "prohibited"
speech events such as plagiarism. The scope of such prohibitions would
undoubtedly be influenced by pre-existing patterns of wealth, power, and
access to media resources (as they are today), and given the extant
skewed power imbalances, could result in more firmly entrenching concentrations of media power, rather than dispersing them.135
132. Berne Implementation Act of 1987 Hearingson H.R. 1623 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 331-84 (1988) (statement by David Ladd on behalf of the Coalition to Preserve the American Copyright Tradition, which is an lobbying organization of copyright industries
such as publishers and other media producers).
133. KAPLAN, supra note 43, at 4.
134. J.M. Balkin describes "ideological drift" as observing how:
political and legal ideas can change their political valence over time from progressive to
conservative and back again ....
Ideological drift occurs because political, moral, and
legal ideas are and can only be made through signs that must be capable of iteration and
reiteration in a diverse set of new moral, legal and political contexts.
J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1831, 1833 (1991).
135. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (protecting corporate speech
in striking down state statute that prohibited orporations from communicating on any topic other
than those issues materially affecting the corporation); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding
that the part of the Federal Election Campaign Act which limited independent campaign expenditures was unconstitutional). Taken together, Buckley and Belloti indicate the degree to which the
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Rotstein himself points out when discussing Superman that legal arguments utilizing textual concepts such as "convention" or "genericity"
and "modulation of convention" have the potential for deployment on
both sides of a case.1 36 Similarly, there is nothing in the "toolkit" of
textual strategies which would necessarily prevent them from yielding
results which impact negatively on free speech interests.
For example, trademark law ostensibly has a much greater deference to context, convention, and genre, stressing the need to prevent consumer confusion between commercial marketplace goods. 137 However,
despite trademark law's contextually sensitive character, a trademark
owner's increasingly concretized property-like rights in a mark have frequently trumped free speech concerns in several state law anti-dilution
cases which have ruled against "recodings," or subsequent unauthorized
uses of marks, even in the absence of consumer confusion.1 38 These rullegal backdrop already favors powerful "private" speech of corporations and PACs; See generally
David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAWS: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 237
(David Kairys ed., 1990); Hutchinson, supra note 130, at 28.
136. Rotstein, supra note *,at 773-74; see also GAINES, supra note 38, at 208-28.
137. Trademark law employs a hierarchy of genericity (from least to most protected): generic
marks; descriptive marks; suggestive marks; and arbitrary and fanciful marks. See Scandia Down
Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1147 (1986)
("There are but a limited number words and images suitable for use in describing a product, and
sellers own neither the English language nor common depictions of goods."); 20th Century Wear,
Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 1052 (1985)
("Descriptive terms deserve less protection than suggestive terms both because descriptive terms
normally do not distinguish among similar products and because such terms 'should not be monopolized by a single use.' ") (citations omitted); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A.
1982) ('Trademark law has traditionally imposed restrictions on the right to exclude others from
using certain 'descriptive' symbols to ensure that the opportunity for all to associate such symbols
with their common referents remains unencumbered."); CHISUM, supra note 19, at § 5C[3][a] ("A
mark's classification depends on the relationship between the mark and the goods or services upon
which it is used... a mark's distinctiveness may change due to shifts in usage [and] ...may fit into
one category for one user group and into another for a another user group.")
138. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927); see. eg., Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 630 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1977); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
875 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (no dilution, but defining dilution as "tarnishment of the affirmative associations a mark may come to convey."); Jordache Enters., Inc. v.Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F.
Supp. 48, 56 (D.N.M. 1985), aff'd, 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) ("dilution creates a risk of erosion of the public's identification of a trademark"); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 1989) (condom card with slogan,
"Don't leave home without it" enjoined.); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prod., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (Screw magazine pictorial of Pillsbury trade characters engaging in sexual relations enjoined); General Electric Co. v. Almpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1036
(D.Mass. Oct. 12, 1979) (sale of briefs with GENITAL ELECTRIC on them enjoined); Coca-Cola
Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (sale of poster with "Enjoy COCAINE" written in Coca-Cola style script enjoined); Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 836
F. 2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 109 S.Ct. 326 (1987) (sale of merchandise with MUTANT
OF OMAHA enjoined). See also Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Benefit supra note 117, at
103-37. Cf. Denicola, supra note 84; Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of
Libel, Trademark and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. Rav. 1923 (1985);
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ings have been based on the rationale that unauthorized, but non-competing uses of a mark "dilutes" the value of the mark in the mind of the
public. These antidilution cases amount to a kind of privatized censorship which ostensibly does not implicate state action, because the trademark proprietor is conceived of as merely preventing "tarnishment" to a
"private property-like" interest (a symbol, sign or mark) and is not seen
as stepping on First Amendment speech rights. This line of antidilution
cases have drawn extensive fire from commentators, criticizing the impact on First Amendment issues. Thus, even in a more "audience" oriented, relational, and "textual" area such as trademark, free speech
issues may arise regularly and just as regularly have their speech aspects
suppressed. However, foregrounding "speech events" as a central metaphor in such a regime may dissipate some of the occlusive force of the
idea of property, only to exacerbate barely submerged tensions existing in
liberal legal thought regarding the supposedly value-neutral classification of "speech activities" as either occurring in public or private
contexts.

139

Dreyfuss, supra note 4. But cf.L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir.), cerL
denied and appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987) (First Amendment speech rights may prelude a
tarnishment dilution claim against a commercial parody-such as a sexually explicit parody of L.L.
Bean catalog published in High Society.). See also, Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp.
931 (D.D.C. 1985) (use by public interest group of trademark "Star Wars" to comment on Reagan
administration policies noninfringing). Lighthawk, The Envtl. Air Force v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp.
1095 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (use of U.S. Forest Services trade character, "Smokey Bear" by non-profit
environmental group noninfringing); Girl Scouts of the U.S.A. and Boy Scouts of America v. The
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (use of term
"Pee Wee Scouts" by author of children's books noninfringing).
Relational doctrines like secondary meaning, in which a merely descriptive mark acquires protection through use in specific contexts, is a distant relative of the idea of "modulated convention" as
construed by a generically competent audience.
See, eg., Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir.
1985):
First, we must inquire how much imagination is required on the consumer's part in trying
to cull some indication from the mark about the qualities, or ingredients of the product or
service .... Second, we determine whether sellers of similar products are likely to, or
actually do use, the term in connection with their goods.
Id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 19, at § 5C[3][a] ("A claimant seeking to establish secondary meaning must carefully marshall evidence showing consumer perception of the mark as indicating the
source of the product or service.").
139. There is insufficient space to explore the matter fully here, but First Amendment speech
regulation has repeatedly been plagued by problems of defining impartial, content-neutral speech
restrictions in the areas of enhanced penalties for hate crimes and bans on pornographic materials.
In a contextualist copyright regime as implied by Rotstein, serious problems arising from viewpoint
neutrality (or lack thereof) may be expected to crop up as well. See eg., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down ordinance criminalizing display of symbols such as burning
crosses or swastikas which arouse "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed religion or gender"); State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3435 (Dec. 14, 1992), rev'd, 61 U.S.L.W. 4575 (June 11, 1993) (review of state statute
providing enhanced penalties for crimes committed because of the victim's race, religion or national
origin); American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down
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Commodifying the Intertext

The third problematic area arises on two levels: (1) legal recognition

of intertextual value may encourage increased commodification of such
newly recognized "resources," as has occurred with celebrity publicity
rights; and (2) formal legal recognition may remove a constitutive oppositional element from appropriationist art communities who view unauthorized uses of copyrighted and trademarked works as political speech.
As we have seen, a copyright regime informed by contemporary literary
theory-regarding the open-ended nature of texts and concepts of intertextuality-would recognize some form of limited and context-bound
textual rights in an audience to "recode" and transform "speech events,"

or texts. However, such "recoding" rights may result in commodification of such intertextual materials because of intellectual property law's
tendency to conflate and confuse economic use and social use values.140
The circular way that legal recognition of an intangible's value leads to
enhanced exchange value which then justifies further legal protection,
etc., was noted by Felix Cohen in the 1930s when he asked: do we legally
protect something because it is valuable, or is something valuable solely
because it is legally protected? 14 1
Thus, if copyright law assimilates certain poststructuralist constructs such as the text-as-speech-event, thereby providing legal status
and protection to creators or producers of those constructs, it is by no
means inevitable that such intertextual events (and their artifactual embodiments) will be allowed to proliferate and circulate more freely. But,
given the late capitalist mass-media saturated environment we currently
occupy,1 42 legal recognition of intertextual meaning may only facilitate
city ordinance restricting the distribution of pornography); see e.g., Note, Hate is Not Speech: A
ConstitutionalDefense of Penalty Enhancementfor Hate Crimes, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1993);
Akhil R. Amar, Comment, The Case of The Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REv. 124 (1992); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985).
140. GAINES, supra note 38; Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & EN'r. L.J. 365 (1992);
Coombe, supra note 1, at 1864.
141. See generallyCohen, supra note 6. In analyzing the tradename "Palmolive," Cohen wrote:
The current legal argument runs: One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality
of his product has induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, symbol from of
packaging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is property; the
creator of property is entitled to protection from third parties who seek to deprive him of
his property .... The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base
legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value
of a sales device depends on the extent to which it will be protected.
Id.
142. Coombe, supra note 1, at 1857-66.
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commodification of such "intertexts," as has occurred in the area of publicity rights of celebrities, with similar distortions.
Such commodification of "intertexts" has been discussed in great
depth and rich detail by both Jane Gaines and Rosemary Coombe, who
have examined and described practices of celebrities, their "handlers,"
and audiences regarding publicity rights, 143-the legal protection of the
"text" of a star's persona. 144 Coombe writes:
The law of publicity rights, by prohibiting reproductions of the celebrity image for another's advantage, promotes the mass circulation of
celebrity signifiers by ensuring they will have a market value. If the
image were freely available for mass reproduction, there would, presumably, be less of an incentive to engage in the investments necessary
to disseminate it through media channels. Ironically, then, the law...
produces fixed, stable identities authored by the celebrity subject, but
simultaneously creates the possibility of places of transgression in
which the signifier's fixity and the celebrity's authority may be contested and resisted. Authorized and unauthorized identities are both,
therefore, engendered in relation to this juridical regime. 14 5
Note that legal protection of such interests simultaneously creates
zones of authorized and non-authorized user activities. 14 6 The examples
Coombe uses to illustrate unauthorized textual "recodings" are the use of
assorted trademarked, copyrighted, and otherwise legally "locked-up"
media icons by subordinated subcultures, such as lesbian, hermaphroditic refashioning of unauthorized likenesses of James Dean;147 preStonewall era gay male camp impersonations of female movie stars like
Bette Davis, Joan Crawford, or Judy Garland; 148 and the Star Trek fan
community reformulations of stories, songs, and images employing as14 9
pects of trademarked characters from the copyrighted TV show.
Coombe makes the point that the lack of legal recognition for these
creative intertextual practices creates situations where the images, texts,
characters, stories, and symbols of the dominant culture are "recoded"
by such marginalized subcultures to their own agendas. However, the
mass-cultural intellectual properties with which these subcultures constitute themselves, end up being owned and controlled by large, extremely
143. See CHisuM, supra note 19, at

§ 6G[3][a].

144. Coombe, supra note 140, at 366-76; GAINES, supra note 38, at 84-104, 175-107.
145. Coombe, supra note 140, at 387.
146. Id.("Power may not produce resistance in the Foucauldian sense, but it does not determine
the content of the practices that transgress its strictures.").
147. Id. at 381; see also Sue Golding, JamesDean: The Almost Perfect Lesbian Hermaphrodite,
in SIGHT SPECIFIC: LESBIANS AND REPRESENTATION 49 (Dionne Brand ed., 1988).
148. ESTHER NEwTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERICA (1979);

Coombe, supra note 140, at 380-81.
149. Coombe, supra note 140, at 386; see also HENRY
SION FANS & PARTICIPATORY CULTURE (1992).

JENKINS,

TEXTUAL POACHERS: TELEVI-
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proprietary mass-culture producers who are hostile to unauthorized and
uncompensated uses of their properties.150 Coombe and others argued
that the monologic nature of a steadily increasing and technologically
sophisticated media output has grave implications for a democratic society in which dialogic practices are theoretically foundational. 15 1 The
shift of emphasis entailed by implementing the textual strategies implied
by Rotstein's article would be a step towards encouraging such dialogic
practices, as individuals and groups would be able to legally engage in
"recoding" texts which had heretofore been "frozen," freeing up more
materials and opening up more cultural space for "talking back" at, or
through, the pervasive and dense media languages which constitute
much of our social environment.
Jane Gaines has described how celebrities become "a kind of Foucauldian 'intertext,'" constructed through publicity and promotion, exploitable through merchandising and licensing. 152 Gaines argues that
our intellectual property laws treat these celebrity "intertexts," or
commercial "languages" interchangeably as products of intellectual labor and units of exchange-value [returning] us to the classic description of the commodity, to the masking feature of commodity fetishism,
whereby humans are unable to see that the product they have created
is their own and that they are entitled to the value stored in it because
it is their own congealed labor... [and transforms] works of culture
into economic units and economic units back into works of culture
.... If there is a theoretical antidote to this (and I believe there is) it is
in the social uses of the sign.... [A]ithough the sign may have an

existence as a commodity, it may have.., a separate history not canceled out by its life as a commodity... and because the same sign may
have significantly different meanings to [diverse social] groups, it may
become the center of conflict, an ideological "struggle over
150. Coombe, supra note 1, at 1861-69; see also Gordon, supra note 4, at 99 ("To depict their
reality accurately, and deal with the power others' images would otherwise have over th'em, audiences may need to reproduce artifacts in which copyright subsists. This need is legitimate.").
151. Coombe, supra note. 140, at 389-95; Coombe, supra note 1, at 1857-61, 1877-80; see also
Hutchinson, supra note 130:

The project of dialogic democracy requires an acknowledgment of the substantive value of
public discourse as an expression of power. While the world of the sixteenth century may
have been "a stage,/ And all the men and women merely players," all the world of late
twentieth century is an advertisement and all the men and women merely consumers in the
sprawling marketplace.
Id. See also Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/PostmodernReconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 291 (1985); Frank 1. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreward: Traces of Self
Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493
(1988).
152. GAINES, supra note 38, at 192; see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 603 P.2d 425
(1979). RICHARD DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES: FILM STARS AND SOCiETY (1987); Peter L. Felcher
& Edward L. Rubin, The Descendability of the Right of Publicity: Is there Commercial Life After
Death?,89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,Publicity, and the
Portrayalof Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979).
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meaning.

, 15 3

While celebrity publicity rights do not equate completely with the
poststructuralist textual strategies proposed by Rotstein for copyright
law, there a few parallels. Even a chastened copyright regime which acknowledged and legitimated certain intertextual "recoding" rights might
encounter a similar problem to that encountered in the publicity rights
realm, that is, the rapid and broad commodification of such intertextual
modulations of convention (conflation of economic and social uses) due
to the already in-place disproportionate wealth, access, and economic
power of large corporate media producers. However, as Coombe points
out, the very means of implementing such legal rights, also creates further spaces and opportunities for undermining, opposing, and subverting
54
such commodification.1
Michel de Certeau described the reader as a subject who is actively
engaged in "poaching:" "Far from being writers.., readers are travellers; they move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads
poaching their ways across fields they did not write, despoiling the
wealth of Egypt to enjoy it themselves."' 55 De Certeau's picture of the
reader/media-consumer as a text-shattering nomadic poacher, collaging
splinters of texts into new, unstable configurations of meaning has a distinctly oppositional character, particularly when posited in contradistinction to pharonic proprietors of frozen textual meaning. 156 It is this
contrast between nomad and proprietor which brings us to our second,
somewhat paradoxical point, which is also related to the earlier point
about domesticating deconstruction. Legally sanctioning the practices of
such textual poachers through some kind of audience "recoding" rights
may also have the curious effect, in certain circumstances (such as appropriationist art communities) of drastically changing a constitutive element of such practices binding such patchwork subcultures together,
thereby draining the oppositional character out of such "poaching."
Discussing the dilemma of post-modernist artists such as
Sherry Levine,157 David Salle,158 Barbara Kruger, 59 Mike
153. GAINES, supra note 38, at 198.
154. Coombe, supra note 140, at 387.
155.

MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE xvii, 174 (1984) ("Marginality

is today no longer limited to minority groups, but is rather massive and pervasive.... Marginality is
becoming universal. A marginal group has now become a silent majority."). But cf. Stuart Hall,
Encoding/Decoding,in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1980).
156. DE CERTEAU, supra note 155, at 175 (There is also a slight Romantic (although ironic)
content in De Certeau's choice of imagery).
157. FOSTER, supra note 1, at 28, 36, 58.
158. Id. at 52-57, 134-35.
159. IM at 106-08, 111-15, 117.
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Bidlo, t 60 Dara Birnbaum, 161 Jenny Holzer, 162 Louise Lawler,1 63 and
Martha Rosler ' 64 to whom the practice of appropriating elements of
copyrighted imagery is central to their work, Elizabeth Wang has argued
that appropriationist art and copyright law are theoretically irreconcilable, and furthermore, that such artistic (mis)appropriation may also be
constitutively an act of political speech. 165 By legalizing such appropriationist practices, whether through expansion of the fair use doctrine, expanding the political speech defense to infringement liability, contracting
for appropriation rights 166 or, by extension, importing poststructural lit-

erary theory into copyright theory, "legitimization eviscerates appropriation as a form of political discourse." 167 Such legal endorsement or
approval removes the illicitness and oppositional character of such practices, forcing artists who desire political opposition as a crucial contextual element of their "texts" to abandon such appropriationist practices.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has only briefly touched some of the many issues
raised in Robert Rotstein's paper. The textual strategies which Rotstein
advocates assimilating into copyright law should be enhanced by an expanded critique of authorship. Insofar as reimagining the audience as
"co-creators" of a text, a redefinition and broadening of the concept of
authorship is also relevant. Secondly, I have made three brief observations of problems which might confront such a chastened, newly contextualized copyright regime: (1) conservative political opposition and
entrenched powerful interests would not like to see their intellectual
properties de-commodified to the extent that recharacterizing such
properties as texts emphasizes such texts as speech acts and not private
intellectual property; (2) that textual strategies which reconceive of copyright as speech regulation can potentially cut both ways, particularly
160. Id. at 36, 38.
161. Id. at 99-100.
162. Id. at 109, 110-11, 116.
163. IM at 98, 99-100, 103-04.
164. Id. at 99-100, 118, 153.
165. Elizabeth H. Wang, (Re)Productive Rights" Copyright and the Postmodern Artist, 14
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 261 (1990); see also Carlin, supra note 59, at 110-11 ("To understand
Appropriation as transcending... one must accept that our social environment is increasingly determined by simulated signs, and that the realm of the 'imaginary' has supplanted that of the 'real' in
determining our sense of self and nature.") (citations omitted); Greenberg, supra note 52, at 1.
166. Wang, supra note 165, at 276-80.
167. Id. at 281. But compare Patricia Krieg, Note, Copyright, FreeSpeech and the Visual Artm 93
YALE L.J. 1565, 1568 (1984) ("he absence of a definitive legal standard for appropriation of visual
images results in a chilling of freedom of speech interests. Artists, will hesitate to experiment with
creative modes if such experimentation may result in liability for copyright infringement.").
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given already extant wide disparities of wealth, power, and access to media; and (3) as with the case of celebrity publicity rights, the opening up
and legal recognition of a new resource (such as intertextual expression)
may also put that resource up for rapid commodification, over-exploitation, and distortion.

